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The Case of Operation Market Garden
David Patrick Houghton
© 2015 David Patrick Houghton

Abstract: This article applies the groupthink model of decisionmaking to the planning for Operation Market Garden in late 1944.
It shows especially strong parallels between decision-making in the
Market Garden case, and those of the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and the
Challenger shuttle disaster.

I

n 1982, social psychologist Irving Janis—heir to a long line of others
who had shown how social pressures and the power of the situation
can combine to make us do things we never dreamed we would—published the second edition of his book Groupthink.1 Originally published a
decade earlier, the book articulated the “groupthink” hypothesis, arguing
certain tight-knit groups were especially prone to making policy errors.
Some groups induce conformity or groupthink, a process through which
a group reaches a hasty or premature consensus and then becomes effectively closed to outside ideas.
In Janis’s groupthink model, the rationality of decisions is distorted
by dysfunctional group and social forces because members come to
prize unanimity and agreement over considering all courses of action
rationally.2 Janis referred to this tendency as a “concurrence-seeking.”3
Once the group has reached its decision, that decision cannot be revisited
or reconsidered. Dissenters are progressively excluded or shunted aside
altogether. “Self-censorship” occurs as those who disagree with the
chosen course of action remain silent, often because they think changing the minds of others is hopeless. Furthermore, “mindguards” are apt
to appear, individuals who take it upon themselves to police the decision
taken and to dissuade dissenters from rocking the boat. This action can
sometimes lead to the removal of a determined dissenter from the group
altogether, or else to the effective silencing of the individual.
Janis discussed a number of the symptoms of groupthink as well
as the antecedent conditions that could produce it.4 These conditions
encourage the symptoms but do not necessarily produce them. Of these,
an especially important factor is group cohesiveness, where a “clubbish”
atmosphere develops between the members. Often this atmosphere
occurs when the decision-makers have spent a great deal of time with
1      Irving Janis, Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
2      Ibid., passim.
3      Ibid., vii.
4      Ibid., 174-197, where Janis lays out the theory at length.
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one another or begin to socialize together. During the Kennedy/Johnson
era, for example, many members of the administration stayed in the
same posts for several years and came to know one another very well.
While cohesiveness is critical to many teams - including military ones
- this trait is a double-edged sword; a group in which members become
overly familiar with one another can come to think alike and can fail
to question each other’s assumptions. Decisions regarding Vietnam,
for instance, were made by a collection of like-minded individuals who
agreed on aspects of foreign policy, and cultivated an atmosphere of
consensus.
Other pre-conditions include a history of failure, stress induced by
time pressure, and overly directive leadership of the type that allows no
disagreement. Margaret Thatcher, for instance, was known for arriving
at meetings already having decided what she wanted, stating her position
upfront and then effectively challenging others to disagree with her.
There is also what Janis calls “suave leadership,” where a leader induces
docility and a false sense of complacency.5 The presence of a charismatic
president in 1961 during the disastrous Bay of Pigs episode appeared to
reinforce the idea that the plan was in fact a good one. But he allowed
the CIA to monopolize the discussion, failing to encourage his advisers
to ask tough questions that might have exposed the plan’s flaws before
it went into effect.
The symptoms of groupthink, similarly, take on disturbingly
common forms. They include the following:
•• Illusions of invulnerability. The group comes to believe it cannot lose. As
Janis sees it, the new Kennedy officials who came to office in 1961
were laboring under an illusion of invulnerability, believing they were
winners.6 Unaccustomed to losing, JFK had emerged victorious from
a very close presidential election in late 1960, and persuaded similarly
youthful “can do” figures to join him in office.
•• Rationalizing away problems. Risks and dangers are waved away and
treated as insignificant. Many of the supporters of the decision for
intervening in Vietnam compared it to the Korean War, and Johnson’s
views drew explicitly on this analogy. Johnson dismissed the differences as insignificant.7 A war of insurgency was hence treated as if it
were a conventional conflict like Korea.
•• Belief in the group’s inherent morality. This condition exists when decisionmakers see themselves as morally correct. The Kennedy officials in
1961 viewed themselves as the “good guys,” moral men who were on
the right-side of history. Surely this was enough to do the job? The
same was true of Johnson’s group, which came to see itself as the
purveyor of morality, despite the fact that Vietnamese civilians were
continually being caught in bombings by American B-52s.
•• Stereotyping the opposition – the group comes to see the adversary as
weak or stupid. In 1961, Kennedy’s advisors overestimated US capabilities and stereotyped the enemy—Fidel Castro—as both weak and
5      Ibid., 42.
6      Ibid., “A Perfect Failure: The Bay of Pigs,” and “Escalation of the Vietnam War: How Could
It Happen,” and 35-37.
7      See, for instance, Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the
Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 110-111.

Thinking Strategically

Houghton

77

unpopular (both assumptions were wrong). The staying power of Ho
Chi Minh was similarly underrated, and US policymakers thought he
would cave to graduated bombing.
•• Illusions of unanimity – the group comes to see itself as wholly united.
Some – notably Arthur Schlesinger – privately harbored doubts about
the Bay of Pigs plan, as did a few other Kennedy advisers. Schlesinger
did send Kennedy memoranda in which he questioned various
assumptions behind the plan. But when he was given the opportunity
to speak up in official meetings before the plan was implemented,
he remained strangely silent. In Janis’s words, Schlesinger engaged
in “self-censorship.” As the Vietnam group became more and more
cohesive, it closed in upon itself. Members became increasingly
unwilling to revisit old decisions or reassess their collective wisdom.
•• The emergence of dissenters – the supposed unanimity is exposed as an illusion, since “transgressors” emerge. As we have noted, Schlesinger and
others did eventually express their doubts. In the Vietnam case not
everyone within the administration agreed with Johnson’s eventual
decision to escalate the war in 1965. Dissenters like Clark Clifford and
Undersecretary of State George Ball quickly stepped forward, arguing
the United States could not win without paying unacceptable costs
to do so. While Johnson initially gave Ball a sympathetic hearing,
the Undersecretary of State became less trusted over time. Others
on the inside dealt with any dissent by implying the decision-maker
was somehow “burned out” or even ill. The phrase “I’m afraid he is
losing his effectiveness” became a standard refrain, as more and more
members of the Johnson administration left government for good,
despairing of ever changing the president’s mind.
•• The emergence of “mindguards.” This condition occurs when various
means are employed to get dissenters to “toe the line,” which may
involve marginalization or complete exclusion from the group. When
they finally spoke out against the consensus to go ahead with the Bay
of Pigs plan, both Schlesinger and Chester Bowles (Undersecretary
of State) were effectively mindguarded. Just as bodyguards protect
against physical threats, mindguards are said to act as guardians of
the group’s collective conscience. Bowles sent his boss, Dean Rusk, a
strongly-worded memorandum which challenged the plan’s assumptions; but Rusk apparently shoved this in his desk and did not pass it on
to the president.8 In Vietnam, meanwhile, mindguards like National
Security Advisor Walt Rostow would tell the president what he wanted
to hear and keep dissenters away from the oval office. Eventually, even
one of the original architects of the war, Robert McNamara, began
to have doubts about its wisdom. When he started to express these
doubts outside the inner circle, Johnson compared him to a son who
had let slip to prospective buyers of a house that there are cracks in
the basement.9

Three Caveats

At this point, three caveats should be noted. First, although Janis
was vague on the issue of how many symptoms of groupthink have to
8      Ibid., 40-42.
9    Ibid., 118.
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be present before one can reliably diagnose it, he was clear that most of
them have to be present. For instance, it is not sufficient to note some
dissenters were present, since this is almost always the case. For practically any decision, there are people who can honestly say afterwards they
disagreed. After the raid to get Osama Bin Laden in 2011, for instance,
it became clear Robert Gates (then Secretary of Defense) had been
opposed to a military infiltration of Bin Laden’s base in Abbottabad,
Pakistan. Equally, there were those who wanted to go ahead. But to
diagnose groupthink, most or all of Janis’s symptoms must be present
(an illusion of invulnerability or unanimity was arguably missing from
the Bin Laden case, for instance). But as we shall see in the Market
Garden case, a whole range of symptoms manifested themselves.
Secondly, there are plenty of policy failures where we can show
groupthink was not at work; errors can be individually-based rather than
resulting from the group, or may derive from bureaucratic politics or
inter-service rivalry. As Janis noted,
...obviously, one cannot assume that groupthink is the cause of practically all
policy miscalculations and fiascos. Anyone who relies on that naïve assumption in reading a case study would be carrying out a worthless exercise in
unadulterated hindsight.10

Some policymaking fiascos emerge from the application of dubious
analogies by leaders who have first-hand experience of the events.
Lastly, groupthink does not always lead to disaster. Policy successes
that involved an element of groupthink may somehow work anyway.
Like Clausewitz, Janis conceded there are moments when chance intervenes; decision-making processes are only one determinant of success
or failure. A group can also reach the right conclusion via the wrong
route. The relationship between groupthink and policy outcomes, Janis
notes, is imperfect.

Operation Market Garden

There has been relatively little interplay between theories of foreign
policy decision-making like groupthink and the study of strategy. Even
Norman Dixon’s On The Psycholog y of Military Incompetence, which deals
briefly with Market Garden, does not conceptualize the failures which
occurred in groupthink terms (even though the theory is covered in his
book).11 In fact, none of the standard accounts of the Arnhem affair
attempt to apply an overarching theory such as groupthink.12 Instead,
they focus on detailing what went on during the operation, apportioning
10    Janis, Groupthink, 193.
11      Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Pimlico Books, 1994),
399-400.
12      Of these, by far the most famous is Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 2007). But there are many others, a number of them by participants in the events
themselves. See for instance Christopher Hibbert, The Battle of Arnhem (London: Batsford, 1962);
Roy Urquhart, Arnhem (London: White Lion, 1973); Lewis Golden, Echoes from Arnhem (London:
William Kimber, 1984); Geoffrey Powell, The Devil’s Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (Barnsley:
Leo Cooper, 1992); Peter Harclerode, Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors (London: Arms and Armour
Press, 1994); Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1995);
A.D. Harvey, Arnhem (London: Cassell, 2001); John Frost, A Drop Too Many (Barnsley: Leo Cooper,
2001); David Bennett, A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, the Arnhem Operation
September 1944 (Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate, 2008); and Sebastian Ritchie, Arnhem: Myth and Reality
(London: Robert Hale, 2011).
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blame and ultimately debating whether the operation was a wise military
move or ill-considered (and therefore doomed) from the very start.
Accordingly, this brief piece tries to demonstrate the ultimate value
of applying a groupthink explanation to the planning behind Market
Garden. As we shall see, an intriguing number of symptoms as well
as some of its most potent antecedent conditions were visibly present.
Avoiding groupthink requires an ability to rethink and reassess in the
light of new information, or evidence which has been seen in a new light;
but this was made impossible by the time constraints imposed.
Market Garden was a truly bold and inventive plan. Some have
even seen it as strategically brilliant in conception, though most authors
consider it a heroic failure. While the definition of success and failure is
partly in the eye of the beholder, John Buckley captures the consensus
view of Arnhem when he argues “it was a poorly conceived, ill considered and deeply flawed plan which stood little chance of success before
it had even begun.”13 Other accounts have already done a good job of
outlining its key features, so these will be dealt with only briefly here and
only as particular aspects of the plan pertain to the theory of groupthink.
However, its essential elements were the air component (Market) and
the land one (Garden). In September 1944, the strategic problem was
that eight bridges lay between the Allies in France or Belgium and the
industrial Ruhr in Germany, including key Dutch bridges at Eindhoven,
Nijmegen and Arnhem. It was assumed that capturing the Ruhr valley,
on which the German war making machine depended, would quickly
cut Berlin’s capacity to fight. Using three sets of airborne troops – two
American and one British – the basic idea was to drop soldiers quickly
behind enemy lines. The Allies would thereby leapfrog over the German
defensive wall and attempt to capture all key bridges simultaneously.
Speed and surprise were absolutely critical, since catching the Germans
off guard was the only way to make this bold military plan work.
Needless to say, it did not work as intended. For the Allies, the
numbers killed, wounded, or missing exceeded an astonishing 17,000;
as many as 10,000 Dutch civilians may have died as well. As Dixon puts
it, “defeat was absolute and terrible.”14 And the military objectives, of
course, were not achieved, since the Germans successfully repelled the
attack and took many Allied soldiers prisoner.
Was the decision to go ahead taken in a group setting, or was it taken
unilaterally? As the name suggests, groupthink is obviously a groupbased process, and decisions which are not taken in a group context
therefore do not fit within the remit of the theory. Available evidence is
admittedly thinner on this question than on other aspects of the decisionmaking, partly because Montgomery was rather secretive about his own
decision-making processes. It is, of course, possible he was a “lone wolf”
who made decisions entirely on his own. Yet, the available evidence suggests he was not. First of all, it would have been impossible for a figure
like Bernard Montgomery – who had lost overall control of the Allied
war effort to Eisenhower – to violate the chain of command or fail to
consult with others. We know he obtained Eisenhower’s permission to
13      John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 1944-45 (London: Yale
University Press, 2013), 208.
14      Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence, 148.
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go ahead with the plan, though the relationship between the two men
was difficult at best.15 More tellingly, we know meetings were held at
various stages before the green light was given.
The key planning meeting at which it was decided to go ahead with
Operation Market Garden was held on September 10, 1944. Anxious to
go, most members of the group strongly believed in what Montgomery
was planning.16 There was an especially pervasive feeling that a “single
thrust” was all that Allied resources could do. There was also a strong
sense of unanimity within the group that aligned with Montgomery’s
absolute conviction he was right. The group also believed intelligence
emanating from the Dutch underground was not to be trusted, based
on past experience.
The objections of those who felt Montgomery was not correct seem
to have been wholly ignored or swept aside. Forrest Pogue notes, “some
individuals at 12th Army Group and First Allied Airborne Army, and
even some members of the 21st Army Group staff, expressed opposition
to the plan.”17 Among those who disagreed, Monty’s own Chief of Staff,
General Francis de Guingand, did not feel the plan could work. Brigadier
Ronald Belchem, his Chief of Operations, disliked the “narrowness” of
the thrust.18 We also know General Sir Miles Dempsey, Commander of
the British 2nd Army, advocated an airborne drop at Wesel; dropping
at the Arnhem bridge, he argued, made little strategic sense.19 All were
overruled by Montgomery; he desperately wanted it to go ahead.

Antecedent Conditions

Time Pressure and a History of Failure/Cancellation. Janis always emphasized that various things can aid in (or make more likely) the appearance
of groupthink. One is simple time pressure, along with the frustration
that inevitably accompanies repeated cancellations or failures to launch.
This is not to say time pressure necessarily leads to disaster; but the
decisions which led to the ill-fated Challenger mission in January 1986
provide a classic example.20 On five or six occasions the shuttle launch
was scrapped or delayed, mainly due to bad weather and other technical
issues. These delays led to immense pressure to go ahead, increasingly
embarrassing officials at NASA. However, it was an unusually cold
winter day in Florida, and employees like Roger Boisjoly tried to warn
their bosses the O-Rings which connected sections of the solid rocket
booster used to put the shuttle into space were simply not tested at such
low temperatures; hence, they might shatter with absolutely catastrophic
effect. Sadly, this advice was ignored, and the O-Rings did indeed fail,
causing the shuttle to explode.
In the case of Market Garden, a large variety of plans – no less than
sixteen, by one count - had already been scrapped prior to the decision to
15      Thomas Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York:
Penguin Books, 2013), 81-95.
16      Alistair Horne and David Montgomery, Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1955-1945 (New York:
HarperCollins, 1994), 283.
17      Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1996),
281.
18      David Irving, The War Between The Generals (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 72.
19      Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper, 1952), 488.
20      See the film Groupthink (CRM Films, 1991), which recreates the shuttle launch decisionmaking with actors, using Janis’s theory.
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go ahead. Operation Comet, for instance, had just been scrapped prior
to Market Garden, much to the frustration of men who were anxious to
get into battle. The sense of hurry was also encouraged by the feeling the
Germans were on the run, and Montgomery believed their presumed
disarray could be exploited.
Suave Leadership. A further background factor that may encourage
groupthink is what Janis calls “docility fostered by suave leadership.”21
The tactless Montgomery seemed anything but charismatic, although it
should be noted charisma is very subjective. More than Montgomery,
though, one figure who was almost universally agreed to have ‘oozed’
such qualities was Brian Horrocks of XXX Corps. Horrocks was an
immensely charismatic figure who, in the eyes of one observer at the
time, would have made “a very good salesman.”22 While Horrocks was
not a key decision-maker, his salesmanship of the plan may well have
contributed to the general sense of camaraderie and to the feeling that
Allied forces could not lose.
Aggressive Leadership. Overly assertive or aggressive leadership is
another one of the classic antecedent conditions which can encourage
groupthink, as when a leader comes into the meeting room having
already decided what she/he wants. Montgomery’s aggressive leadership
was always likely to give rise to a dysfunctional decision-making process,
and there is some evidence he “knocked down” anyone who disagreed
with him. Brigadier Bill Williams and General Walter Beddell Smith
would both complain afterwards they simply could not get Montgomery
to change his mind. What is also known is Montgomery was more generally an aggressive leader who rarely if ever brooked objections to his ideas.
Indeed, even after the failure of the operation, he would insist (rather
absurdly) that it had been “90% successful.” As Max Hastings argues,
“this was nonsense, for it was a cul-de-sac which took the Allies nowhere
until February 1945 … the Arnhem assault was a flawed concept for
which the chances of success were negligible.”23
Montgomery’s arrogance was legendary. Brighton talks of his
“obstreperous behavior towards his seniors,” Sosabowski thought him
“recklessly overconfident,” Irving calls him “spiky” and self-obsessed,”
while Ricks speaks simply of Montgomery’s “egotism.”24 The Field
Marshal’s own official biographer, Nigel Hamilton, goes even further,
arguing that by 1942 “Monty’s egoism, his doctrine of quasi-papal infallibility, began to mushroom, and the final vestiges of modesty were
cast overboard.”25 He “refused to listen to the exhortations of his main
Headquarters staff,” and would frequently exasperate his colleagues.26

21      Janis, Groupthink, 42-44.
22      Sydney Jarey, quoted in the BBC series Battlefields, “Arnhem.”
23      Max Hastings, Inferno: The World At War, 1939-1945 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2011), 561.
24      Terry Brighton, Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War (New York: Crown Books, 2008),
219; Irving, The War Between the Generals, 42; and Ricks, The Generals, 85.
25      Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty’s War Years, 1942-44 (New York: McGraw Hill,
1983), 142.
26      Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field Marshal, 1944-1976 (New York: McGraw Hill,
1986), 73.
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Symptoms
The Illusion of Invulnerability

In 1944, there was a sense among many British servicemen after the
routing of the Germans in France that “we cannot lose.” Montgomery
had also been through a victorious campaign in North Africa and
been integral to the conquest of Sicily. He had enjoyed one military
success after another, which made him immensely popular in Britain. As
Harclerode notes, “the relative ease with which the Allies had advanced
through northern France into Belgium had resulted in a dangerous and
misplaced sense of euphoria which permeated their forces at all levels.”27
Others argue there was a kind of “victory virus” infecting Monty and
his group within 21st Army.28 By the time the plan went ahead, the
Germans had reorganized and regrouped sufficiently to put up a highly
effective defense, and fanatical SS troops had also been held in reserve
as reinforcements.

Collective Rationalizations

Here the group ignores or rationalizes away evidence that challenges its shaky assumptions. In a perfectly rational world, of course,
new information would be taken on board and strategies altered. But
as Janis maintains this is all too often not how things work in practice.
Market Garden depended above all on two closely related factors: the
element of total surprise, and the airlift capability necessary to put an
airborne force close to the eight bridges in Holland at a moment’s notice.
Sadly, because the Allied planners lacked the second capability – and the
planners would not or could not put the men and material in with the
speed required - they could not provide the first.
The transporter of choice for the men – which would convey both
men and gliders –was the American Dakota C-47 Skytrain. But there
were simply not enough of them to put both men and equipment into
the battle in one go; it would take three days to do so because Browning’s
superior, General Lewis Brereton, feared exhausting his crews by
forcing them to do two runs in a single day. Two drops might have been
performed in a single day: one by the RAF at night, and one by USAAF
forces during the day. But this would have meant waiting several days
for moonlight, and the planners were not interested in further delays.
All of this meant the element of surprise upon which Market
Garden would depend would be gone. Montgomery clearly realized this
was a problem. The fact they had insufficient airlift and would lose the
element of surprise altogether might scupper the whole thing. But he
simply insisted the plan could not be changed. He also wholly discounted
Walter Bedell Smith’s warning about the presence of panzer divisions in
the Arnhem area. Similarly, when presented with photographic evidence
that two German panzer divisions were there, General (Boy) Browning
simply rationalized the information away. “I wouldn’t trouble myself
about these if I were you. They’re probably not serviceable at any rate,”
he told his astonished subordinate Major Brian Urquhart.29
27      Harclerode, Arnhem, 38.
28      Horne and Montgomery, Monty, 273. The Montgomery referred to here was Bernard’s son.
29      Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, 142.
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A Belief in the Group’s Inherent Morality

It hardly needs to be noted that the planners of Market Garden saw
themselves as morally superior to the opposition. While it is hard to deny
the proposition that Hitler himself was morally evil, as well as at least
some of his deputies. The war gave rise to a number of morally “gray”
areas though, such as the Allies indiscriminate bombing of civilians, in
the hope of dramatically shortening the war.30

Stereotyping the Enemy as Evil, Weak or Stupid

It was certainly true German intelligence was woefully unprepared
for the timing of what occurred. However, the Allied planners seem
to have greatly overplayed their hand, especially by claiming that the
enemy was weak. The clearest manifestation of this came in the belief
– apparently widespread amongst the planners – the invading force of
British and Americans would be met only by “old men and boys.”31 This
was perhaps the most mystifying belief of all, but it can be traced to
intelligence reports which suggested the enemy was in complete disarray
after its collapse in France. The Allies saw the enemy as ineffective and
completely demoralized.32
This, of course, ignored other intelligence which suggested Arnhem
was well-defended by SS troops, evidence which genuinely troubled
Urquhart and others. In fact, the Germans were fully aware Arnhem
was a key access route to the Ruhr and industrial Germany. In that
sense, it is amazing how British planners underestimated the Germans.
In reality, Arnhem and the other bridges between France and Germany
were the obvious next target.

The Illusion of Unanimity

The planning group seemed to be unanimous in its approval of
Market Garden, but this masked what were in fact real divisions within
it. Generals Stanislaw Sosabowski and James Gavin had major doubts
about the plan, but neither voiced these forcefully. Indeed, Sosabowski
went so far as to ask Browning for a written order during the previously
cancelled but similar Operation Comet, convinced his men were about
to be massacred. But having voiced his dissent already to little or no
effect, Sosabowski saw little point in doing so again during the planning
for Market Garden. As Cornelius Ryan relates:
Despite Sosabowski’s anxieties , at the September 12th briefing, he remained
silent. ‘I remember [Roy] Urquhart asking for questions and nobody raised
any,’ he recalled. ‘Everyone sat nonchalantly, legs crossed, looking bored. I
wanted to say something about this impossible plan, but I just couldn’t. I was
unpopular as it was, and anyway, who would have listened?33

30      See for instance Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Penguin
Books, 2013).
31      See Chris Brown, Battle Story Arnhem 1944 (London: The History Press, 2011), 57; and John
Nicol and Tony Rennell, Arnhem: The Battle for Survival (London: Penguin Books, 2011).
32      Horne and Montgomery, Monty, 273.
33      Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, 126.
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Emergence of Dissenters

The best-known dissenter within Browning’s own staff was Brian
Urquhart. Urquhart was greatly worried by intelligence gleaned from
the Dutch and from British overflights which suggested the presence of
two SS panzer divisions, since the lightly armed paratroopers could be
easily wiped out by the heavily armed panzers. Intelligence is sometimes
ambiguous, especially during the fog of war, but the mission had also
already reached an advanced stage. Urquhart’s dissent parallels that of
Arthur Schlesinger in the Bay of Pigs case, George Ball in the Vietnam
example, and Roger Boisjoly in the Challenger one. In all of those cases,
the concerns of the dissenter were downplayed or ignored, but were
ultimately proven correct.
Urquhart’s dissent may be the most famous and best documented,
but it was perhaps the least consequential due to his relatively junior
status. Both the Intelligence Chief to the British 21st Army and
General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff are known to have held similar
positions to Urquhart’s, and both had access to more sensitive intelligence which showed the young officer was absolutely correct.34 The
Chief of Intelligence for the British 21st Army, Brigadier Bill Williams,
had access to secret ULTRA intelligence, for instance. Williams went
directly to Montgomery on two separate occasions warning of the presence of the Panzer divisions, but was ignored. Days later, Montgomery
received a similar visit from Walter Beddell Smith, Eisenhower’s
American Chief of Staff, who had seen the same evidence. But when
Beddell Smith visited Montgomery in person, his concerns were summarily dismissed.35 Intelligence from at least three separate sources had
pointed to the existence of panzer divisions.

Emergence of Mindguards

As we have seen, dissenters are dealt with in part via the emergence
of mindguards. These are individuals who take it upon themselves to
suggest the dissenter’s advice is of little or no value. Stating the dissenter
is “sick” or “losing his mind” are common ways of doing this, as when
Johnson suggested the dissenter Robert McNamara was literally “cracking up” over Vietnam.
Browning dealt with Urquhart’s dissent by suggesting “his nerve
had broken.”36 While Urquhart was certainly under great pressure—
all of the planners were—he was apparently dealing rather well with
this, and subsequently rose to become Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Urquhart said later Browning treated him:
...as a nervous child suffering from a nightmare…I was a pain in the neck...
Colonel Eggar, our chief doctor, came to visit me. He informed me that
I was suffering from acute nervous strain and exhaustion and ordered me
to go on sick leave. When I asked him what would happen if I refused,
he said, in his kindly way, that I would be arrested and court-martialed for
disobeying orders.37

34      Harclerode, Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors, 38-45.
35      Ibid, 39.
36      Christopher Hibbert, quoted in the BBC series Battlefields, “Arnhem.”
37      Urquhart, A Life In Peace and War, 73.
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Conclusion

The presence of wishful thinking is very much in evidence in the
Market Garden case. Those who conceived and planned the operation,
as well as those who implemented it, desperately wanted it to succeed.
As has often been noted, victory at Arnhem would have shortened the
war by four months, and thousands might have been saved thereby. In
retrospect, it might also have changed the shape of the Cold War, since
the Allies would probably have reached Berlin before the Russians.
The theory of groupthink has been widely criticized as well as
praised since it first appeared in the early 1970s. For one thing, critics
have often been suspicious of the “fit” between Janis’s case studies and
the various causes of groupthink, and have criticized the blurring of
preconditions, symptoms, and effects. But the presence of his symptoms
in the Market Garden instance – a case he never studied – is intriguing,
and worthy of further study.38 Montgomery was told there were major
flaws in his plan. Yet, the prize itself proved too tempting to resist.
Avoiding groupthink requires an ability to reassess goals in the
light of new information or evidence. But this was made impossible by
artificial time constraints. As Sunstein and Hastie note, when we are in
possession of information which cuts against the grain, “people have a
strong tendency to self-censor.”39
The groupthink phenomenon is not inevitable, however, and the
US military can take measures to safeguard against it. For instance, a
member of the group can be appointed as a “critical evaluator,” ensuring
all viewpoints are heard; leaders can absent themselves from meetings
in order to avoid advisers becoming “yes men.” They can also break
the group into option-based units, each given the task of explaining the
merits and demerits of a course of action. Or outsiders can be brought
in to provide fresh views and counteract any “clubbishness” within the
group. A “devil’s advocate” can be created, whose job is to argue against
whatever position emerges as the consensus view.40 Similarly, Alexander
George has shown how the use of devil’s advocates, the rigorous exploration of alternatives and what he calls “multiple advocacy” – ensuring a
given administration is filled with a diversity of voices – can counteract
an overly-hasty rush to judgement.41

38      See for instance John Levine, “Reaction to Opinion Deviance in Small Groups,” in Paul
Paulus, ed., Psychology of Group Influence, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1989); and Paul
‘t Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990).
39     Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink To Make Groups Smarter
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2015).
40      Janis, Groupthink, 260-311.
41      Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information
and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 169-208.

